Cooperation in Multi-hop Cellular Networks by Salem, Naouel Ben et al.
Cooperation in Multi-hop Cellular Networks ∗
Naouel Ben Salem†, Levente Buttya´n‡, Jean-Pierre Hubaux†, Markus Jakobsson§
Technical Report Nr. IC/2003/55
Abstract
In multi-hop cellular networks, the existence of a communication link between the mobile station
and the base station is not required: a mobile station that has no direct connection with a base station
can use other mobile stations as relays. Compared with conventional (single-hop) cellular networks, this
new generation can lead to a better usage of the available spectrum and to a reduction of infrastructure
costs. However, these benefits would vanish if the mobile nodes do not properly cooperate and forward
packets for other nodes. In this paper, we propose a charging and rewarding scheme to encourage the
most fundamental operation, namely packet forwarding. We analyse the robustness of our protocols
against rational and malicious attacks. We show that our protocols thwart rational attacks and detect
malicious attacks. We also show that our solution makes collaboration rational for selfish nodes.
Keywords: Cooperation, Multi-hop Cellular Networks, Hybrid Cellular Networks, Ad Hoc Networks, Packet
Forwarding, Security, Pricing, Charging, Billing
1 Introduction
The geographic area covered by a conventional cellular network is populated with base stations that are
connected to each other via a backbone. A mobile node can use the network when it has a direct (single-
hop) connection to a base station, but as soon as it is beyond the reach of the base stations coverage, the
mobile node is disconnected from the cellular network. For the operator, the usual solution to this problem
is to increase the coverage of the network by adding antennas, and for the user to move until he reaches a
covered region. An alternative solution would be to allow multi-hop communications in the cellular network,
which makes it possible for the isolated node to ask other nodes to relay its traffic to or from a base station.
The resulting network [1, 34, 12, 2, 32], frequently called multi-hop cellular network, presents several
benefits [24, 13, 25, 22]. First of all, the coverage of the network is increased while the number of fixed
antennas is kept relatively small. Second, the energy consumption of the nodes can be reduced because the
signal has to cover a smaller distance. And finally, as the radiated energy is reduced, the interference with
other nodes diminishes as well.
Given the advantages listed above, multi-hop cellular networks represent a new and promising paradigm.
However, the proper operation of this new family of networks requires the mobile nodes to collaborate with
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each other. This collaboration is not guaranteed in a civilian network, where each node represents a single
authority. Indeed, forwarding packets is energy-consuming and a selfish user can tamper with his mobile
device to remove the relaying functionalities or simply shut down the device when he is not using it. A
systematic denial of the packet forwarding service would remove all the benefits introduced by the multi-
hop aspect of the communications.
In this paper, we propose a technique to foster cooperation for the packet forwarding service in multi-hop
cellular networks. This solution is based on a charging and rewarding system.
This paper extends and completes our previous treatment of the same problem [3]. This work is part
of the Terminodes Project [19, 4, 15]. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the
system, including the adversarial model, in Section 2 and describe our proposed protocols in Section 3. In
Section 4, we analyse the robustness of our solution against rational and malicious attacks and we show
that the charging and rewarding scheme indeed encourages cooperation in multi-hop cellular networks. In
Section 5, we present an estimate of the communication and computation overhead of our protocols. Finally,
we describe the related work in Section 6 and we present our conclusions and future work in Section 7.
2 System model
The essence of our proposal is a set of protocols that encourages the nodes to cooperate in multi-hop cellular
networks.
2.1 Assumptions
The system consists of a set of base stations connected to a high speed backbone and a set of mobile
nodes. The mobile nodes use the base stations and, if necessary, the backbone to communicate with each
other. Communication between the mobile nodes and the base stations is based on wireless technology.
We assume that all communication is packet-based and that the links are symmetric (i.e., the nodes and the
base stations have the same power range). We also assume that all the base stations and the backbone are
operated by a single operator that is fully trusted by all mobile nodes, be it for charging, for route setup, or
for packet forwarding.
We call a cell [24] the geographical area under the control of a given base station. The power range of
the base station is smaller than the radius of the cell, meaning that some nodes should rely on multi-hop
relaying to communicate with the base station. We consider an ad hoc model in which mobile nodes move.
However, we assume that the routes are stable enough to allow for the sending of a substantial number of
packets and thus to amortize the cost of running a (reactive or proactive) routing protocol. We also assume
that all links are bidirectional.
We assume each node i to be registered with the operator and to share a long-term symmetric key Ki
with it. Ki is the only long-term cryptographic material stored in i. The secret keys of all the nodes in the
network are maintained at the operator.
2.2 Rationale of the solution
When a mobile node A (the initiator) wants to communicate with another mobile node B (the correspon-
dent), it first establishes an end-to-end session with B (as we will see in detail, in Subsection 3.2, a session
is a route on which all nodes are authenticated). This is done by establishing an initiator session between A
and the base station of the initiator BSA and a correspondent session between the base station of the corre-
spondent BSB and B. These sessions are used to exchange packets between A and B, in both directions.
For each packet, we call S its source (which is A or B) and D its destination (therefore B or A, re-
spectively). The base stations of S and D are denoted by BSS and BSD , respectively. The packet is then
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sent by the source S to BSS , if necessary in multiple hops. If D resides in a different cell, then the packet
is forwarded by BSS to BSD via the backbone. Finally, the packet is sent to D possibly in multiple hops
again1. If one of the routes is broken, then a new session is established using an alternative route.
Note that the system model described above is similar to that of [24] with the difference that we require
all communication to pass through a base station. Although this may lead to suboptimal routes, our model
has the advantage of significantly reducing the complexity of routing from the nodes’ point of view, since
they only have to maintain a single route (to the closest2 base station) instead of one route per potential
correspondent. Of course, the base station has to maintain a route to every node in its cell.
In order to motivate the intermediate nodes to forward the traffic, we propose to charge the initiator A
for the traffic in both directions and reward the forwarding nodes (the operator is rewarded as well). We take
advantage of the presence of the trusted operator and assume that it maintains a billing account for every
node in the system; our remuneration scheme (see Subsection 3.4.1) is implemented by manipulating the
appropriate billing accounts.
Our protocols are based entirely on symmetric key cryptography. Although asymmetric cryptographic
primitives may seem to be more suitable for implementing some of the functions of our scheme, they have
a high computational overhead (compared to symmetric key primitives), which prevents their application in
resource constrained mobile devices.
2.3 Adversarial model
Attacker model: An attacker A is rational if it misbehaves only when this is beneficial in terms of remu-
neration, service provision or ressource saving. Otherwise,A is malicious (i.e., it misbehaves even if it loses
money, energy, . . . by doing so). The users are selfish and thus, each node in the network is potentially an
attacker. We assume that several attackers can collude and share information to perform more sophisticated
attacks. We also assume that an attacker is occasionally able to compromise “good” nodes by retrieving
their secret keys.
Attack Model: We do not attempt to ensure secrecy or anonymity of communication and thus, we
do not study passive attacks (where the attacker records and analyzes the exchanged data without altering
them). Instead, we are interested in active attacks, where the attacker modifies, deletes or injects data in
the network. We consider exclusively the attacks performed against the different phases of the proposed
protocols and we identify the following active attacks:
• Packet dropping: A drops a packet it is asked to forward.
• Replay: A replays a valid packet from an expired or still existing session.
• Filtering: A modifies a packet it is asked to forward.
• Emulation: A uses the secret key of a node it compromised to perform actions in its name.
Secure routing protocol: Securing the routing protocol is beyond the scope of this paper; several
solutions to secure routing in ad hoc networks have been proposed [17, 18, 29, 30, 6, 35, 16] and can be
used as an underlying routing mechanism in our protocol. Therefore, we will not consider attacks such as
abnormally long routes, routing loops, black or gray holes, wormhole attack etc.
Encouraging cooperation: We will show in Subsection 4.1 that the packet dropping attack is not ratio-
nal. This means that cooperation is the best choice for a rational selfish node.
1Clearly, the communication ends are not necessarily both wireless. However, in this paper, we assume that to be the case as
this corresponds to the most complete scenario.
2The distance from a given node to the base station can be expressed in termes of number of hops, time, cost, etc. . . .
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3 Proposed solution
In this section, we will provide a detailed description of our solution. In particular, we will describe the
protocols of the different phases sketched in Subsection 2.2.
3.1 Building blocks and notation
Our protocols use two cryptographic building blocks: a MAC (Message Authentication Code3) function and
a stream cipher [27]. However, our use of these cryptographic primitives is unconventional:
• During the session setup phase (see Subsection 3.2), we need all the nodes in the path to authenticate
the request message and, instead of appending one MAC computed by each of the nodes to the mes-
sage, we use an iterative “MAC layering” technique. The principle of this technique is explained in
Subsection 3.2. Our solution achieves a similar effect to that of the classical MAC appending tech-
nique while keeping the size of the request constant. Therefore, our technique is more efficient in
terms of bandwidth usage. To the best of our knowledge, such a scheme has not been proposed yet
for ad hoc networks.
• During the packet sending phase (see Subsection 3.3), we apply an iterative stream cipher encryption
mechanism that can be considered as an “implicit” authentication mechanism because it allows the
operator to verify that the packet took the route it was supposed to take. At the same time, it thwarts
the free-riding attack (see Subsection 4.3).
Notation: We denote the concatenation operator by | and the XOR operator by ⊕.
3.2 Session setup
As explained in Section 2, when an initiator A wants to communicate with a correspondent B, it first has
to set up an end-to-end session. The goal of the session setup is (i) to test the initiator route (route between
A and BSA, containing a relays) and the correspondent route (route between BSB and B, containing b
relays), obtained from the underlying secure routing protocol; (ii) to authenticate all nodes belonging to
these routes; and (iii) to inform these nodes about the traffic that will follow. A node can decide not to
join the session, in which case the session setup fails and a new session is established using an alternative
secure route. Successful completion of the session setup phase is a confirmation that both the initiator and
correspondent routes are operational and that all the intermediate nodes on both routes accept to forward the
traffic.
Figure 1: The session setup phase
In order to set up a session, A generates an initiator session setup request message AReq0 that contains
a fresh request identifier AReqID (e.g., generated in sequence), the secure initiator route ARoute, and some
3Throughout this paper, MAC will stand for Message Authentication Code and not for Medium Access Control.
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information TrafficInfo about the traffic to be sent4. In addition, the request has a field oldASID to carry
the session ID of the broken initiator session, in case the request is sent to re-establish a broken session.
This field is set to zero in case of a new session establishment. Finally, AReq0 contains a MAC computed
by A using its secret key KA:
AReq0 = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |
MACKA(AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo) ]
Each forwarding node i (1 ≤ i ≤ a) on the initiator route checks the traffic information TrafficInfo. If
i decides to participate in the forwarding, then it computes a MAC on the whole message using its own key
Ki, replaces the MAC in the request with the newly computed MAC, and forwards the request AReq i to the
next hop (or to BSA) where:
AReq i = [ AReqID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo |MACKi(AReq i−1) ]
Thus, when the request arrives to BSA, it contains a single “layered” MAC that was computed by A and
all the nodes on the initiator route in an iterative manner. BSA then repeats all the MAC computations and
checks the result against the MAC in the received request. It also verifies that the request ID is fresh (i.e.,
the message is not a duplicate) and if the request is sent to re-establish a broken initiator session, it verifies
that oldASID corresponds to a valid session identifier previously initiated by A. If one of these verifications
is not successful, then BSA drops the request, otherwise, it sends the request, via the backbone, to the base
station BSB . BSB generates and sends a correspondent session setup request BReq0 towards B:
BReq0 = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo ]
where BReqID is a fresh request identifier generated by the base station BSB , oldBSID is the session ID of
the broken correspondent session, in case the request is sent to re-establish a broken session and BRoute is
the secure correspondent route.
Each forwarding node j (1 ≤ j ≤ b) on the correspondent route computes and sends BReqj in the same
way as the forwarding nodes in the initiator route did:
BReqj = [ BReqID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo |MACKj (BReqj−1) ]
When B receives the request BReqb, it returns to BSB a correspondent session setup reply BRep that
contains the correspondent request ID BReqID and a MAC that is computed over the received request
BReqb (including the MAC therein) using the key KB of B:
BRep = [ BReqID |MACKB (BReqb) ]
The reply is relayed back without any modifications to BSB on the reverse route of the request. BSB
checks the “layered” MAC and if it verifies correctly, BSB informs BSA that the session is valid. Then BSA
(respectively, BSB ) sends an initiator (respectively, a correspondent) session setup confirmation message
towards A (respectively B). The initiator session setup confirmation message AConf contains the initiator
request ID AReqID and two freshly generated random numbers AUSID and ADSID representing the
initiator session IDs to be used for packets sent from A to BSA and from BSA to A, respectively. It also
4The initiator A may have no precise information about the traffic B will generate. TrafficInfo is thus an estimate for the
expected traffic in both directions. If A underestimates the traffic, the relaying nodes might interrupt the packet forwarding because
the amount of data to forward is much larger than expected.
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contains a series of MACs where each MAC is intended for one of the nodes on the initiator route (including
A):
AConf = [ AReqID | AUSID | ADSID | AMACA | AMAC 1 | . . . | AMAC a ]
AMAC i = MACKi(AReqID | AUSID | ADSID | oldASID | ARoute | TrafficInfo)
The correspondent session setup confirmation BConf has a similar structure:
BConf = [ BReqID | BUSID | BDSID | BMAC 1 | . . . | BMAC b | BMACB ]
BMAC j = MACKj (BReqID | BUSID | BDSID | oldBSID | BRoute | TrafficInfo)
Each node on the initiator and correspondent routes (including A and B) verifies its own AMAC or
BMAC and stores the two initiator or correspondent session IDs, respectively. The state information related
to the established sessions (including session IDs, routes and cryptographic parameters) is stored in the
operator’s database. Then, using its secret key Ki and the session identifier, each node i involved in the
communication generates a session key K ′i (e.g., K ′i = hKi(SID)) that it will use during the packet sending
and the payment redemption phases. The base stations BSA and BSB also compute the session keys of all
the nodes involved in the communication and save them locally.
The session becomes active for the base stations when they send the confirmation messages and for
the nodes when they receive a valid confirmation message. Node i starts a timer ti when it receives the
request message; ti is restarted each time i receives a valid message or packet that belongs to the session.
Node i closes the session if ti expires; Closing a session means that the node will discard all messages
or packets of the session. The nodes and the base stations keep state information in the memory until the
acknowledgement and (if needed) packet receipts are sent to the operator (see Subsection 3.4).
Note that in case of initiator (respectively, correspondent) session re-establishment, it is not necessary to
also re-establish the correspondent (respectively, the initiator) session if the latter is still valid. The broken
session is re-established using an alternative route and it is linked to the other (still valid) session in the
operator’s database.
3.3 Packet sending
Once the session has been set up, S (which is A or B) starts sending packets to D.
Figure 2: The packet sending phase
The `-th packet SPkt0,` sent by S contains the session ID SSID (which is AUSID if S = A and BUSID
if S = B), the sequence number `, and the payload Payload `. It also contains the receipt SRcpt0,` that
can be used by the intermediate nodes, if needed, to provide the operator with a proof that they correctly
received the packet (details about the computation and the use of the receipts are given in Subsections 3.4.4
and 3.4.1). In addition, S computes a MAC on the packet using the session key K ′S and encrypts the body
of the packet (including the MAC) by XORing it with the pad PADS,`:
SPkt0,` = [ SSID | SRcpt0,` | ` | Body0,` ]
where SRcpt0,` = MACK′S (SSID | `)
and Body0,` = PADS,` ⊕ [ Payload ` |MACK′S (SSID | ` | Payload `) ]
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The pads PAD i,` are generated by node i (i = S for the source) as follows (see Figure 3): the session
ID SSID (DSID for the down-stream nodes) and K ′i are used as a seed to initialize the key stream generator
of the stream cipher. Then, PAD i,` is chosen as the `-th block of length MaxLength of the generated key
stream, where MaxLength denotes the maximum allowed length of packets in bytes. If the length L` of the
packet to be encrypted is smaller than MaxLength , then only the last L` bytes of PAD i,` are used, the rest
of PAD i,` is thrown away.
Figure 3: Encryption of the packets
The node i in the up-stream route (route between S and BSS ) verifies that the packet is not a duplicate,
updates (and stores) the receipt SRcpt i,` and encrypts the body of the packet using the pad PAD i,`:
SPkt i,` = [ SSID | SRcpt i,` | ` | Body i,` ]
where SRcpt i,` = MACK′i(SSID | SRcpt i−1,`)
and Body i,` = PAD i,` ⊕ Body i−1,`
When BSS receives the packet, it retrieves the session keys of the nodes on the up-stream route, recom-
putes the pads and removes all encryptions from the packet. Then, it checks the MAC and checks that the
packet is not a duplicate. If one of these verifications is not successful, then it drops the packet. Otherwise,
it forwards it5 to the base station of the destination BSD . BSD changes the up-stream session ID to the cor-
responding down-stream session ID DSID (which is BDSID if S = A and ADSID if S = B), computes a
new MAC for D, computes the pad PADj,` for each node j on the down-stream route (route between BSD
and D), including D, and encrypts the packet (including the MAC) by iteratively XORing it with all these
pads. The result is:
DPkt0,` = [ DSID | ` | Body0,` ] where
Body0,` = PAD1,` . . .⊕ PADd,` ⊕⊕PADD,` ⊕ [ Payload ` |MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) ]
BSD stores MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) of every packet it sends together with the sequence number
` in order to be able to verify future destination acknowledgements and packet receipts. Note that for the
down-stream, we do not need to add a field dedicated to the receipt. Upon reception of DPkt j−1,`, each
node j computes and stores the receipt DRcpt j,` for the packet (as explained in Subsection 3.4.4), decrypts
the body of DPkt j−1,` by XORing it with the pad PADj,`, and forwards the result DPkt j,` to the next hop
where:
DPkt j,` = [ DSID | ` | Bodyj,` ]
where Bodyj,` = PADj,` ⊕ Bodyj−1,`
5The packet is forwarded only if it is a data packet. The treatment of up-stream acknowledgement packets is presented in
Subsection 3.4.2.
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When the packet reaches D, it removes the remaining encryption pad by XORing the packet with
PADD,`. D can then verify the validity of the MAC generated by BSD and store the MAC and ` for
the generation of the acknowledgement (see Subsection 3.4.2).
3.4 Payment Redemption
3.4.1 Charging
As we have already mentioned in Subsection 2.2, charging and remuneration are performed by the network
operator, by manipulating the accounts of the nodes. When BSS receives the packet Pkt` of length L` sent
by the source S, the initiator A is charged a given amount n(L`) (depending on the packet size) and the up-
stream forwarding nodes are credited α(L`). The down-stream forwarding nodes are credited when Pkt`
is acknowledged by D (see Subsection 3.4.2) because the operator may have no other reliable information
about the delivery of the packet. The only motivation for D for not sending the acknowledgement is to save
resources. In order to discourage this misbehavior, D is charged a small amount ε when BSD injects Pkt`
in the down-stream route and reimbursed when Pkt` is acknowledged. Note that, as the operator cannot
distinguish between a packet loss and the case where D does not want to send the acknowledgment, it cashes
the charge ε if no acknowledgement arrives for the packet Pkt`.
If the packet is dropped or lost in the up-stream route, the nodes that relayed it can present the receipt
for this packet (see Subsection 3.4.4) to the operator. The operator identifies the last node k (1 ≤ k ≤ u)
in the path who sent a valid receipt for the packet and gives it a reward β(Lmin) whereas the nodes that
are before k in the path receive a reward α(Lmin), where Lmin denotes the minimum length of a packet6.
A is charged n′(Lmin) = (k − 1).α(Lmin) + β(Lmin). Receiving β(Lmin) can be perceived by k as its
reward for informing the operator that the nodes 1 to k − 1 in the path behaved properly. The β-reward
should be sufficiently large to strongly counterbalance the cost c of forwarding the packet and the cost c′ of
maintaining and sending the receipt (β  c and β  c′). Note that α should be substantially larger than β
to prevent nodes from systematically dropping packets (α β).
If the packet is dropped or lost in the down-stream route, the nodes that relayed it are rewarded in a
similar way as for the up-stream forwarding nodes, except for α(Lmin) and β(Lmin) that are replaced by
α(L`) and β(L`), respectively, because the operator received the packet and knows its real length L`. The
initiator A is fully charged n(L`).
Note that the charges and rewards depend only on the packet size and not on the number of forwarding
nodes in the path. The operator will then take a loss for long routes but will make a profit from short routes.
The charges and rewards should thus be set so that – relative to the average path length – the operator makes
the desired profit on average.
3.4.2 Destination acknowledgement
The destination D must acknowledge every packet it correctly receives. However, in order to save resources,
it does not send acknowledgements on a per packet basis. Instead, the session is subdivided into “time peri-
ods7” and the packets received during each period are acknowledged in a single batch. The acknowledgment
DAck t of the t-th time period of the session is formatted as the payload of a regular packet8 and sent by D
via the down-stream route to BSD, some time during the t + 1-th time period (e.g., at a randomly chosen
6The packet did not reach the base station, so the operator has no idea about its real length. We choose to give a reward equivalent
to the one a node gets when it forwards the shortest possible packet in order to avoid that a forwarding node drops short packets it
is asked to forward in order to get higher reward.
7We suppose that the nodes are at least loosely synchronized with their base station.
8It is necessary to be able to differentiate between a data packet and an acknowledgement (e.g., by using a flag bit)
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moment). The body of the acknowledgment packet is:
DAck t = [ DBatcht | DFirstPkt t | DLastPkt t | DLostPktst |
MACK′D(DBatcht | DFirstPkt t | DLastPkt t | DLostPktst) ]
where DFirstPkt t and DLastPkt t are the sequence numbers of, respectively, the first and the last received
packets during the t-th time period, DLostPktst is the list of sequence numbers of the missing packets




MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `)
where MACK′D(DSID | ` | Payload `) is the MAC received in the packet Pkt `.
The packet is forwarded as a regular packet of the session. WhenBSD receives it, the packet is decrypted
and identified as being an acknowledgement. Then, BSD verifies the MAC and checks DBatcht by XORing
all the MACs of the packets from DFirstPkt t to DLastPkt t, excluding those in DLostPktst and comparing
the result with the received value. If the verification fails, then BSD ignores the acknowledgement. If BSD
does not receive DAck t during the t+1-th time period or if the throughput is not satisfactory (i.e., too many
lost packets), an alternative route is used to establish a new session.
3.4.3 Up-stream acknowledgment
To attenuate the effect of several malicious attacks (see Section 4), the base station BSS sends a single
acknowledgment UAck t to S for all the packets it received during the t-th time period of the session. UAck t
is sent in a regular packet and its format is similar to the format of DAck t, except that the base station does
not have to provide a Batch-like proof to the source:
UAck t = [ UFirstPkt t | ULastPkt t | ULostPktst |
MACK′S (UFirstPkt t | ULastPkt t | UDLostPktst) ]
When S receivesUAck t, it identifies it as being an acknowledgement and checks its validity by verifying
its MAC. S can choose to re-establish the session to BSS using an alternative route if no acknowledgement
arrives for a given time period or if the throughput is unsatisfactory.
3.4.4 Packet receipts
The concept of receipt we use in this paper is similar to the one used in [36]. It does not represent a proof
that the node forwarded the packet but rather that it received it correctly. As we will see in Subsection 4.1,
the use of the receipts helps to make packet forwarding rational.
For an up-stream forwarding node i, the receipt SRcpt i,` for the packet Pkt` is sent together with the
payload and it is computed as explained in Subsection 3.3. We need a field dedicated to the receipt in the
up-stream part of the communication, because if a part of the packet is used to compute the receipt, BSS has
no way to verify it in case of packet loss, which is the very purpose of the receipts.
For a down-stream forwarding node j, the receipt DRcpt j,` is computed as follows:
DRcpt j,` = MACK′j (DSID |Mj,`)
where Mj,` represents the MAC part of the packet DPkt j,` (i.e., if the MAC is encoded on 16 bytes,
then Mj,` represents the last 16 bytes of the packet DPkt j,`). It is possible for the operator to verify the
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receipts because it stores the MACs of the packets (they are also used to compute/verify the destination
acknowledgements) and because we use the last bytes of the padsPADj,` to encrypt and decrypt the packets.
In order to save memory space, both up- and down-stream forwarding nodes do not store the receipts
for each packet but rather for a whole session; the forwarding node i stores a batch for each session it is
involved in as a forwarding node:
BatchSID,i =
⊕
`≤LastPkt ; ` 6∈LostPkts
Rcpt i,`
where LastPkt is the sequence number of the last packet received so far and LostPkts is the set of the
sequence numbers of missing packets preceding LastPkt .
Note that for a node in the initiator route, AUSID and ADSID correspond to two distinct sessions.
When a given session is closed and the last destination acknowledgement is sent, the operator informs the
forwarding nodes involved in the communication about the rewards they received (typically when the node
is within the power range of a base station). If a node i forwarded a packet Pkt` and was not paid for it, i
sends the receipt to the operator. If the receipt is valid, the node is rewarded as explained in Subsection 3.4.1.
A node can ask for remuneration (by sending the receipt) even if it did not provide the service. Note that a
single receipt is sent to ask remuneration for several packets.
The format of the packet receipt sent to the operator is the following:
RcptSID,i = [ SID | BatchSID,i | LastPkt | LostPkts |
MACK′i(SID | BatchSID,i | LastPkt | LostPkts) ]
Upon reception of this message, the operator verifies the MAC and if the verification is positive, it
remunerates the node according to the charging scheme (see Subsection 3.4.1).
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we study the robustness of our protocols against the attacks identified in Subsection 2.3. We
do not consider attacks against the routing protocol or denial of service (DoS) attacks based, for example,
on jamming.
4.1 Packet dropping
In this attack, an attacker A that is part of the end-to-end route between S and D decides to drop a packet
it is asked to forward. In this paragraph, we consider the effect of the attack on the different phases of our
protocols and we show that this attack is not rational. This result is interesting, particularly for the packet
sending phase, because it proves that our solution fosters cooperation.
Session setup phase: A can drop one or several of the following messages:
• The request message: the sender of the request (which is A or BSB) would not receive the confirma-
tion or the reply message, respectively. It would then establish a new session to the target (BSA and
B, respectively) using an alternative route. Note that dropping the request message is not necessarily
an attack because the forwarding nodes can decide not to participate in a given session.
• The reply message: BSB would never receive the reply and the correspondent session setup would
fail. BSB would then use another route to establish the correspondent session.
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• The confirmation message: some of the nodes involved in the communication would not be aware of
the establishment of the session. If the initiator A is the source of the first packet to be sent during
the session, we can have two cases: (i) A is in the initiator route, therefore A would not receive
the confirmation message and would consider that the session setup failed; It would then establish a
new session using another route. (ii) A is in the correspondent route; The session would be active
for all the nodes, except for those that are after A in the correspondent route (including B); These
nodes would thus discard all the packets sent by A during the session. The destination (which is B in
this case) would not be able to send the periodic acknowledgment to BSB and the session would be
re-established.
The problem is totally symmetric if B is the source of the first packet of the session. In both cases,
this attack is not rational and can be detected rapidly by the operator.
Packet sending phase: In this paragraph, we show that denying to forward packets is not rational;
cooperation is thus the best choice for a selfish, rational node.
Proposition 1 If a node i received a packet Pkt` to forward and if, later on, Pkt` was not acknowledged
by the target (BSS for the up-stream and D for the down-stream), then it is rational for i, once the session
is closed, to send a receipt for Pkt` to the network operator.
Proof: As explained in Subsection 3.4.2, after a given session is closed, the operator informs the nodes
involved in that session about the rewards they received. If a node i correctly forwarded (or simply received)
Pkt` and was not paid for it, i can send a receipt for it.
Sending a receiptRcpt of lengthLRcpt (see Section 5 for numerical values) represents a cost of c′/NumPkts
per packet, where NumPkts denotes the number of packets received by i during the session and c′ denotes
the cost of sending Rcpt . Given the assumption of route stability (see Subsection 2.1), it is possible to
neglect c′/NumPkts in comparison with c (and thus in comparison with α and β) because NumPkts is
large.
If i decides not to send a receipt for Pkt` or if it sends an invalid receipt, then its payoff is:
• 0 if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• −c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following nodes sent a valid receipt for it,
• α− c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the following nodes in the path sent a valid receipt
for the packet.
If i sends a valid receipt for Pkt`, then its payoff is:
• β if i dropped Pkt` during the packet sending phase,
• β − c if it forwarded Pkt` but none of the following nodes sent a valid receipt for it,
• α− c if it forwarded the packet and at least one of the following nodes in the path sent a valid receipt
for the packet.
Given that (i) a forwarding node cannot know if the receipt is valid or not before sending it to the
operator, (ii) the cost of sending the receipt is negligible and (iii) α β  c, we can state that sending the
receipt is rational. 2
Proposition 2 If all the nodes involved in the communication are rational, then forwarding the packet Pkt`
is rational for node i.
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Proof: As we will show in Subsection 4.3, the filtering attack is malicious. The nodes involved in the
communication being rational, they will not perform this attack on the packets they are asked to forward and
thus the receipts produced by the intermediate nodes would be correct.
If node i decides to defect and drops a packet Pkt` it is asked to forward, i will still send a receipt for
Pkt` since, according to Proposition 1, this is the rational behavior. The payoff of i would then be β.
If i decides to cooperate, then:
• if Pkt` reaches its target, then the payoff of i would be α− c,
• if on the contrary Pkt` does not reach its target, then at least one node j (j > i) would send a receipt
for it (according to Proposition 1) and the payoff of i would also be α− c.
As we have α β  c, cooperation is rational for node i. 2
Proposition 3 If the route contains an attacker that repeatedly drops the packet Pkt`, then the network
operator can identify it.
Proof: As long as Pkt` is relayed by rational nodes, the packet is computed and correctly forwarded
until it reaches the malicious node A that drops it. The rational nodes that are before A in the path will
then send valid receipts for Pkt` (according to Proposition 1). The operator would identify the last node k
in the path that sent a valid receipt, which is A or the rational node that is before it on the route (because
A is also able to generate a valid receipt for the packet). The operator would then suspect both k and
k + 1 of misbehavior. By crosschecking the information about different sessions and identifying the nodes
that are suspected significantly more than average, the operator can identify the attacker and punish it in
consequence. Note that if A performs this attack only few times, then the detection would be slower but the
attack would be less harmful. 2
Proposition 4 Forwarding the packet Pkt` is rational for node i even if an attacker A will drop it later on.
Proof: Node i has no information about whether the nodes after it in the path are rational or not. If it
expects all of them to be rational, then the best choice for i is to cooperate (according to Proposition 2). If it
expects node i+1 to be rational, then the best choice for i is to cooperate (its payoff would be α−c because
according to Proposition 1, i+ 1 would send a receipt for the packet). Finally, if it expects node i+ 1 to be
malicious and drop the packet, then the best choice for i is also to cooperate because otherwise the operator
would eventually believe it is malicious (according to Proposition 3) and would punish it. 2
Payment redemption phase: The acknowledgement is encapsulated in a regular packet and the body
is encrypted by all the nodes in the path, including the generator of the acknowledgement. An attacker A
has thus no way to distinguish a packet containing an acknowledgement from a data packet9. A brute force
attack would be for A, in order to specifically drop the t-th acknowledgement, to drop all the packets sent
during the t+1-th time period. The consequence of this attack would be the re-establishment of the session
using another route.
4.2 Replay attack
We will consider that a replay attack performed by an attacker A is successful if the replayed message or
packet is considered as valid by all the parties involved in the communication (including the operator)10.
9It is possible for the attacker to identify the acknowledgement packet if it has a fixed and predefined length. If we want to
remedy this, the generator of the acknowledgement should insert some padding.
10Fooling just one or several relay nodes does no more harm than a DoS attack based, for example, on jamming.
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Note that A is not necessarily part of the network. In this paragraph, we will show that this attack is
malicious and never successful.
Session setup phase: The operator maintains the information about all the sessions established so far.
The replayed message (request, reply or confirmation) would thus be detected by the first base station that
receives it.
However, a detection at the nodes is also possible. Indeed, when a node i receives a replayed request
message, it can identify it as a duplicate (and discard it) if:
• i is not part of the route in the request
• or the session to be established is already active or it is closed but still in memory11
• or i is supposed to be the initiator of the communication
Packet sending phase: As for the session setup phase, the duplicate is detected by the first base sta-
tion that receives it. But here, the intermediate nodes are also able to detect it. Indeed, each forwarding
node maintains the list of all packets it has received so far (for the computation of the receipt, see Subsec-
tion 3.4.4). The sequence number of the packet to forward would then correspond to the identifier of an
already handled packet and the duplicate would be discarded.
Payment redemption phase: The operator maintains the list of all acknowledgements and receipts it
receives and can thus detect (and discard) a replayed message. Furthermore, as explained in Subsection 4.1,
it is difficult to identify the packets containing the acknowledgements and thus to replay them specifically.
4.3 Filtering attack
An attacker A that performs a filtering attack modifies one or several fields of the packet it is asked to
forward. In this Subsection, we will analyse the effect of this attack on our protocols. We also consider
the free-riding attack where two colluders A1 and A2 on the end-to-end route attempt to piggyback data
(using appending or substitution) on the exchanged packets, with the goal of not having to pay for the
communication.
Session setup phase: A can tamper with:
• The request or the reply messages: the verification of the “layered” MAC will fail and the base station
(BSA or BSB) will discard the message. A new session will then be established using an alternative
route.
• The confirmation message: the first node that will receive the tampered message will discard it because
the verification of the MAC will fail. If A tampers with one (or more) MAC(s) in the message, the
first node whose MAC was modified and that will receive the message will discard it. This attack has
the same effect as dropping the confirmation message (see Subsection 4.1) and is detected in the same
way.
The fields of the session setup messages are not encrypted. It is then possible for two colluders A1 and
A2 to piggyback information. However, the size of fields is small enough to make the sending of useful data
very long and fastidious.
Packet sending phase: A can tamper with the different fields of the packet Pkt `.
• Modifying SID , ` or Body i,` would be detected by the target of the packet (BSS for the up-stream
and D for the down-stream) because the “layered” MAC does not verify correctly.
11The mobile nodes do not keep trace of all the messages and packets they received. Rather, they maintain a short-term history
(i.e., on-going sessions and session that are not acknowledged yet).
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• We hereafter define the early duplicate attack, a malicious attack whereA creates a fake packet with a
sequence number ` that it expects to be used by the legitimate source in the (near) future. This packet
is handled as valid by the intermediate nodes (because they cannot verify it) but it is discarded at the
target because the MAC is not correct. However, when the source sends the “real” `-th packet, the
forwarding nodes would consider it as a duplicate and thus would discard it.
Our protocols, as presented so far, are vulnerable to the early duplicate attack. If the operator wants
to attenuate the effect of this subtle attack, it can do so (at the cost of a small overhead) by making
use of hash chains12.
Let us first consider the solution, for the early duplicate attack, for the initiator session. During
the session setup phase, the base station BSA sends the first hash values AUw0 and ADw0 of two
sufficiently long hash chains, in the initiator confirmation message to the nodes in the initiator route
(including A). BSA also sends the hash value AUwm encrypted with the secret key of A in the
confirmation. A can thus retrieve the elements 0 to m of the hash chain and send the hash value
AUw ` (1 ≤ ` ≤ m) with the `-th packet it generates13. BSA sends the hash value ADw ` with the
`-th packet it sends toward A. The intermediate nodes can verify the validity of the hash values by
checking14 thatw0 = h`(w`) (w = AUw or ADw ). The packets containing invalid hash values would
be discarded. The solution is totally symmetric for the correspondent session. Note here that given
w`, one can retrieve the hash values of all the previous packets in the session. This means that packets
out of order should be discarded. But this constraint is logical in our case because we use the notion
of sessions. All the packets are then expected to go through the same route and to arrive in order, the
contrary is thus suspicious.
The use of the hash values can also solve the case where the attacker tampers only with w`; the attack
would be detected at the first node that will receive the modified packet because the checking of the
hash value will fail.
Modifying both w` and ` is an even more subtle malicious attack. Let us assume that a forwarding
node receives the packets Pkt `−1 and Pkt ` to forward. It discards Pkt `−1 and replaces the sequence
number and the hash value in Pkt ` by ` − 1 and w`−1, respectively. The sequence number and the
hash value will be considered as valid by the following forwarding nodes. Of course, the packet will
be discarded at the target because the MAC will not be verified correctly. The attack is possible if the
attacker is part of the route and thus all the nodes on the route would be suspected by the operator. The
first direct effect of this attack is for the source to cancel the session, because the throughput is too
bad; the second effect is that the operator would eventually, by crosschecking the information about
the suspected nodes, identify the attacker.
• The free-riding attack is not rational during the packet sending phase. Indeed, the data sent by A1
cannot be interpreted by A2 because it was encrypted at least by one intermediate node15. If this
attack is performed anyway, it is detected as a “regular” filtering or packet dropping attack (depending
whether A2 forwarded the tampered packet or not).
• Modifying only the receipt in the up-stream packets (there is no field dedicated to receipts in the
down-stream packets) is a malicious attack. If the base station BSS detects such an attack (the packet
is correct but the receipt is not), then it should re-establish the session (if S = B) or ask the initiator
12A hash chain is a chain of N hash values where wN−i = h(wN−i+1)(0 < i ≤ N ) and h is a one-way hash function.
13WhenA is about to run out of hash values, the base station provides it (in the same way the up-stream acknowledgment is sent)
with a hash value AUwm+n. A can then compute n new valid hash values.
14The verification of the hash value can be optimized if we use mechanisms such as [10] for example.
15Having two colluding nodes that are neighbors and that perform the free-riding attack makes no sense because they can
communicate directly with each other.
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to do it (if S = A). Such a radical solution is needed because, as explained in Subsection 3.4.4, the
nodes maintain one batch per session by XORing all the receipts of the packets they handled. If one
of these receipts is incorrect, then the batch is incorrect and the receipt will not verify correctly at the
operator.
• The attacker A can tamper with the packet it is asked to forward but without altering the fields used
by the intermediate nodes to generate the receipts. The following nodes in the route would forward
the modified packet. When the target (BSS or D) receives it, it detects the attack and re-establishes
the session.
Payment redemption phase: The same analysis as for the packet dropping attack during the payment
redemption phase holds.
4.4 Emulation attack
This attack is equivalent to the cloning of a SIM card in a GSM network. It is detected in the same way.
4.5 Hybrid attacks
So far, we analyzed the effect of each of the four active attacks we identified in Subsection 2.3. However,
more sophisticated attacks can combine two or more of the attacks described so far. The description and
analysis of one of these attacks can be found in Appendix II (Supplemental material).
5 Overhead
In this section, we will estimate the communication and computation overheads of the solution we have
described. Reasonable values of the size of the different fields appearing in our protocol are provided in
Table 1. NbFwdrs is the number of forwarding nodes on the route (up-stream or down-stream), ` is the
sequence number of the packet and NbLostPkts is the number of packets lost during the session or the time
period.
Field Name ReqID SID Route TrafficInfo MAC ` Receipt LostPkts
Size (bytes) 4 4 NbFwdrs*16 16 16 2 1 NbLostPkts*2
Table 1: Size of the fields used in our protocol (for both up and down streams)
The request ID and the session IDs are encoded on 4 bytes each to reduce the risk of using the same
identifier for two different requests or sessions. The field Route is the concatenation of the 16 byte identifiers
(assuming e.g. an IPv6 format) of the nodes. The TrafficInfo field is used to inform the forwarding nodes
about the traffic to be generated; using 16 bytes to encode it seems to be reasonable. Finally, we encode `
on 2 bytes to support long sessions and Receipt on only 1 byte because its computation and storage should
be lightweight.
5.1 Communication overhead
Session Setup Phase: According to Table 1, establishing an end-to-end session with NbFwdrs forwarding
nodes (in each of the routes) represents an overhead of 156 +NbFwdrs ∗ 64 bytes.
The session setup overhead is directly related to the lifetime of the sessions, which, in turn, very much
depends on the stability of the routes.
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In order to estimate this overhead, we conducted a set of 100 simulations with a network of 100 nodes
and one base station. The nodes are randomly laid out on a 500x500 m2 single cell16 and the base station is
situated in the center of the cell. We fix the power range of the nodes and the base station to 100 m.
We use the random waypoint mobility model [21] and we discard the first 1000 seconds of simulation
time to remove the initial transient phase [9]. The speed is uniformly chosen between 3 and 23 m/s [33],
which corresponds to an average speed of 10.56 m/s at t = 1000 s. The pause time is 0 s.
In our simulations we are interested in the average lifetime of a route (AvrLT) and the average number
of forwarding nodes (NbFwdrs). After the initial transient phase of each simulation, we randomly choose
a node that has a route to the local base station and we observe the lifetime of this route. The simulation
ends when the route is broken (i.e., at least one link is broken). AvrLT represents the average value of
all these lifetime values over the 100 simulations. Note that we consider the route on only one side of
the communication (the initiator or the correspondent route) and not the end-to-end route. NbFwdrs is
computed for the node we consider for the AvrLT. We do not expect this number to be large for multi-hop
cellular networks.
The results are the following: the route remains stable for an average of AvrLT = 6.58 s (±1.66 s with
95% confidence interval), with an average number of forwarding nodes of NbFwdrs = 1.36. In order to
estimate the amount of information that a node can send during this period of time, we consider the case
where the nodes are running a Voice over IP application using a G.711 Codec (Rate = 64 kbit/s) with a frame
size (including the headers) of 200 bytes [11]. It is possible during 6.58 s to send 52.64 kbytes of data.
Using the numbers of Table 1, we estimate the overhead of the end-to-end session setup, with the pro-
tocol proposed here, to be around 243 bytes,which represents less than 0.5% of the payload. Moreover, as
explained in Subsection 3.2, it is possible to re-establish only the broken initiator or correspondent session,
which reduces this overhead.
The presence of one (or more) active malicious attackers in the end-to-end route can also lead to a ses-
sion re-establishment (see Section 4). However, if the attacks are repeated often, the operator can collect
information about the problematic sessions, identify the suspected nodes and statistically identify the at-
tacker(s) (details about the detection are in Appendix I - supplemental material). Identifying and punishing
the attackers can represent a disincentive to cheat.
Packet Sending Phase: Considering the field sizes of Table 1, we can see that the packet sending phase
represents an overhead of 23 bytes for up-stream packets and 22 bytes for down-stream packets. If the
packet size is 200 bytes (considering again the VoIP example), the overhead represents at most 11.5% of the
packet size. This overhead is reduced if we use larger packets. An additional (and substantial) reduction of
the overhead consists in combining the protocol we propose here with the routing protocol.
Sending the Acknowledgment: The destination acknowledgement and the up-stream acknowledge-
ment are generated each time period and their sizes are 36+2*NbLostPktst bytes and 20+2*NbLostPktst bytes,
respectively. The receipt RcptSID,i is a 23+2*NbLostPkts bytes message that the node i sends directly
(i.e., without relaying) to the operator once per session. We expect the number of packets lost to be small
in both cases (i.e., acknowledgement and receipt) otherwise, as explained in 3.4.2 and 3.4.3, the session is
re-established because the throughput is not satisfactory.
5.2 Computation overhead
In this subsection, we consider the computation overhead for the mobile nodes. The overhead is expressed
in terms of battery consumption and number of computations. However, as shown in [31], we can consider
the battery consumption due to cryptographic computations as negligible compared to the energy needed for
data transmission.
16The shape of the simulated cell is therefore a square; in fact, the specific shape does not significantly affect the results of the
presented simulations.
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Session Setup Phase: This operation requires all the nodes to perform 1 MAC computation and 1 MAC
verification each.
Packet Sending Phase: The main overhead in this phase is represented by the usage of stream cipher
encryption (performed by the source and all the forwarders), which ensures the authentication of the nodes
involved in the communication and prevents the free riding attack. But stream ciphers are very fast, and
some operate at a speed comparable to that of 32 bit CRC computation [14]. Moreover, for each packet, the
source has to perform one MAC computation and the destination has to perform one MAC verification.
Acknowledgment computation: For the destination acknowledgement, D performs one MAC com-
putation/time period and one XOR operation/packet. For the up-stream acknowledgement, S performs one
MAC verification/time period. Finally, for the receipts, each forwarding node performs one MAC computa-
tion/time period and one XOR operation/packet.
Numerical example: As an example, a Celeron 850 MHz processor under Windows 2000 SP can per-
form a MAC computation (and verification) with HMAC/MD5 algorithm at 99.863 Mbytes/s and a stream
cipher encryption (and decryption) using Panama Cipher (little endian) algorithm at 120.301 Mbytes/s [14].
These speeds are to exemplify the range; if slower (or faster) processors are used, it would of course scale
correspondingly.
6 Related work
In this section, we discuss some research efforts related to the issues of the cooperation of nodes in (pure)
ad hoc networks and in multi-hop cellular networks.
Cooperation in multi-hop cellular networks: In [23], Lamparter et al. propose a charging scheme
to encourage cooperation in hybrid networks (i.e., mobile ad hoc networks with access to the Internet,
which they call “stub ad hoc networks”). They assume the existence of an Internet Service Provider that
authenticates the nodes involved in a given communication and takes care of charging or rewarding them.
However, [23] and our current approach present two main differences. First of all, in [23], the authors
analyse the robustness of their solution only against rational attacks, whereas in our proposal we consider
malicious attacks as well. The second difference is that the cryptographic functions used in [23] are based
on public-key cryptography, whereas our solution is based entirely on symmetric key cryptography, which
is more suitable for resource constrained mobile devices.
In [20], we have proposed a micro-payment scheme for multi-hop cellular networks that encourages
collaboration in packet forwarding. However, our current proposal significantly differs from [20] in many
aspects. First of all, in [20], we assume an asymmetric communication model, where the up-stream com-
munication is potentially multi-hop and the down-stream communication is always single-hop, whereas in
this paper, both the up-stream and the down-stream communications are potentially multi-hop. Second, in
[20], the nodes report a fraction of their packet forwarding actions (on a probabilistic basis) to an accounting
center that determines how the nodes are remunerated. The approach we propose does not rely on reports;
instead, we use the concept of session during which each forwarding node authenticates itself to the base sta-
tion by altering the packet to be forwarded in a specific way. Finally, the protocol proposed in [20] includes
routing decisions, whereas the protocols that we propose in this paper are independent of routing.
Cooperation in ad hoc networks: Several research groups have considered the problem of selfishness
and the stimulation of cooperation in mobile ad hoc networks. In [26], Marti et al. consider the case where
a node agrees to cooperate but fails to do so. Their solution uses a “watchdog” mechanism to identify
the misbehaving nodes and a “pathrater” mechanism to construct routes that avoid those nodes. Both the
CONFIDANT [5] and the CORE [28] approaches propose a reputation based solution to identify and punish
misbehaving nodes. In [36], Zhong et al. rely on a central authority that collects receipts from the forwarding
nodes and charges/rewards the nodes based on these receipts. In [7, 8], Buttya´n and Hubaux use a virtual
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currency (nuglets) to charge/reward the packet forwarding service provision in ad hoc networks.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a set of protocols that fosters cooperation for the packet forwarding service in
multi-hop cellular networks. Our solution is based on the charging and rewarding of the nodes and relies
exclusively on symmetric cryptography techniques to comply with the limited resources of most mobile
stations. We have used the concept of sessions which takes advantage of the relative stability of routes and
we have shown that our scheme stimulates cooperation in multi-hop cellular networks. Finally, we have
analyzed the robustness of our protocols against rational and malicious attacks and have shown that our
solution thwarts rational attacks and detects malicious attacks.
As future work, we intend to extend our protocols to include routing misbehavior. We will consider
techniques that aim at the calibration of the relevant parameters, and study the reaction of the network to
sophisticated attacks (e.g., by means of simulations). We will also explore further the statistical detection,
at the operator, of malicious attacks and we will study the case where several operators exist in the network.
A Identification of the attackers
In this paragraph, we give an idea about how the operator can identify an attacker A that performed one of
the four attacks analyzed in Section 4.
Packet dropping attack
• Session setup phase: As explained in Subsection 4.1, dropping the request message is not considered
as an attack, so there is no need for the operator to identify the “misbehaving” node. The same
reasoning can be applied to the dropping of the reply message because the operator cannot distinguish
it from the dropping of the request message. If the attacker A drops the confirmation message, it can
be identified in the same way as for the dropping of a packet during the packet sending phase (see the
proof of the Proposition 3). Note that the effect of this last attack lasts for two time periods at most.
• Packet sending phase: If A repeatedly drops packets it is asked to forward, it can be identified as
explained in the proof of Proposition 3.
• Payment redemption phase: As explained in Subsection 4.1, this attack is inefficient and thus there is
no need to identify the attacker.
Replay attacks
As explained in Subsection 4.2, this attack is inefficient.
Filtering attack
• Session setup phase: As for the packet dropping attack, an attacker A that tampers with the request
message or the reply message causes the re-establishment of the session using an alternative route.
However, the operator may want to identify A because, contrarily to the packet dropping attack that
is part of the decision making of the nodes, tampering with one of these messages before forwarding
it is purely malicious. Details about the statistical identification of the attacker are in Appendix C.
Tampering with the confirmation message is equivalent to the packet dropping attack and A can be
identified in the same way.
• Packet sending phase: If A tampers with a packet Pkt `, we can have one of the following cases:
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– A tampers with one of the fields used by the intermediate nodes to generate the receipts (SSID
or ` for the up-stream and DSID , ` or Bodyj,` for the down stream). The attacker A can be
identified as explained in Appendix D.
– The early duplicate attack can be performed by an attacker that is not even part of the network.
However, if the solution proposed in Subsection 4.3 is applied, the attack becomes inefficient.
– In Subsection 4.3, we proved that the free-riding attack is malicious. However, if two colluders
A1 and A2 decide to perform it anyway, A1 can be identified as explained in Appendix D (the
case where the packet is dropped by A2 is presented in Subsection B).
– An attackerA that modifies only the receipt field in an up-stream packet can be identified by the
operator as explained in Appendix D.
– An attacker A that modifies a packet without altering the information used to generate the re-
ceipts can be statistically identified by the operator as explained in Appendix C.
• Payment redemption phase: As explained in Subsection 4.3, this attack is inefficient.
Emulation attack
The emulation attack can be detected by the operator if the compromised node seems to be in two
different locations at the same time (e.g., in two non-adjacent cells). Note here that the operator does not
identify the attacker but the compromised node. As the operator cannot distinguish between the emulation
attack and the case where colluders exchanged their secret information, it is reasonable to assume that
the operator will give the node the benefit of the doubt and change its secret key. However, if the same
problem happens again, the legitimate subscriber becomes suspect and the operator can decide to terminate
his contract and to exclude him definitely from the network.
B Description of a hybrid Attack
Two colluders A1 and A2 are on the same route and perform the filtering attack and the packet dropping
attack, respectively.
• If the filtering attack does not modify the information needed by the intermediate nodes to compute
the receipts, the operator will detect a “regular” packet dropping attack and will identify A2 as being
the attacker (see the proof of Proposition 3).
• If, on the contrary, the nodes that are between A1 and A2 are not able to generate valid receipts, then
A1 will be identified by the operator as an attacker that performed a filtering attack (see Appendix A).
The same reasoning can be applied to the case where there are more than two colluders.
C Statistical identification of an attacker
As the operator does not know the identity of the attacker A, it will suspect all the nodes in the route.
The operator keeps the information about the suspected nodes and identifies the nodes that are the most
frequently suspected. A will thus eventually be identified as being an attacker and probably be punished.
Note here that the identification ofA is not possible if the attack is not repeated a sufficient number of times;
but the attack is less harmful if performed only a few times.
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D Identification of an attacker using the receipts
The nodes that are before the attacker A in the route are able to provide the operator with valid receipts for
the packet, whereas the nodes that are after A will provide the operator with invalid receipts. A and the
node after it in the route are thus suspected by the operator and if A repeats the attack a substantial number
of times (when belonging to different routes), the operator will identify it as a malicious node.
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